Whose interests count? Non-human animals,
anthropocentrism and speciesism
- Anthropocentrism is the view that only humans have full moral standing, or that human interests always take priority. Most traditional ethics, and human rights frameworks, are anthropocentric. Some philosophers treat it as a form of speciesism (Horta 2010). Others distinguish them, since a view can put humans first without denying that animals have any moral weight.
- Speciesism is giving less weight to a being’s interests, or none, on the basis of species membership alone. Richard Ryder coined the term in a privately printed leaflet in 1970 (Ryder 1970), and Singer (1975) popularized it. The claim is that species, like race or sex, is not by itself a morally relevant basis for discounting interests.
The core argument. Whatever trait is cited to justify using animals (rationality, language, moral agency), some humans lack it, such as infants and people with severe cognitive disabilities. Either those humans lose protection too, which almost no one accepts, or the real criterion is species membership, which then needs its own justification. This is the argument from marginal cases (Singer 1975; Regan 1983).
Equal consideration is not equal treatment. Singer’s principle is that like interests deserve like weight, not that all beings are owed the same treatment. A pig’s interest in avoiding suffering counts as much as a human’s, but a human’s interest in voting has no animal counterpart. Critics often conflate the two.
Main objections
- Relational views. Diamond (1978) argues that the animal-rights arguments of Singer and Regan contain confusions about moral relations between people and animals. She offers a relational alternative built on the idea of animals as “fellow creatures,” rather than on capacities and interests alone.
- Definitional dispute. Horta (2010) treats speciesism as unjustified by definition. Jaquet (2019) argues that it is a purely descriptive concept, so whether it is wrong needs argument rather than stipulation.
- Political and ecological views. Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) argue that animals’ rights should vary with their relationship to human communities (domesticated, wild or liminal), which is a political rather than purely individualist approach. Ecocentric views, which value ecosystems rather than individual animals, can also conflict with animal rights, for example over culling.
Connection to human rights. Human rights frameworks rest on human dignity, which is anthropocentric by design. The speciesism critique asks whether that grounding can be defended without a further argument. This matters for any argument that pairs veganism with a human rights framing.